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THE FIVE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
BLIND SPOTS OF ECONOMISTS
COMPLICATION
On August 9, 2007, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) decided to 
organize a conference call with the 
twenty largest banks in Europe. 
The problem was that these banks 
were no longer lending each other 
money. Banks were in urgent need 
of money and as one of the bankers 
made it clear: “We need three 
things: we need cash, we need 
a lot, and we need it now” (NRC 
Handelsblad , 2012). The same day, 
the ECB started to inject 95 billion 
euro, followed the next day by 
the Federal Reserve System (FED) 
in the United States (US) with an 
injection of 24 billion US dollars. 
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It was the first sign that something 
was going wrong. However, 
very few people understood the 
significance of it. More than a 
year later, on September 15, 2008, 
Lehman Brothers filed for bank-
ruptcy, and it became clear that 
financial firms worldwide were 
using dubious financial products, 
such as sub-prime mortgages, 
to seduce customers to invest in 
housing, in credit default swaps 
(an agreement that a seller will 
compensate the buyer in the 
event of a loan default; the buyer 
makes a series of payments to the 
seller, and, in exchange, receives 
a payoff if the loan defaults) and 
other complicated derivatives, 
to mitigate risks and stimulate 
customers to invest even more. The 
US housing crisis was spreading 
and became a banking crisis in 
the US and later in Europe. Most 
banks survived due to government 
interventions such as expensive 
nationalizations of banks. The 
banking crisis eventually became 
a sovereign-debt crisis in Europe 
leading to financial problems for 
governments in Iceland, Ireland, 
Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain. 
It may also result in breaking up 
the Euro zone.
An important debate that I 
would like to discuss here is the 
role of economists and how they 
develop economic theory aimed 
at explaining and predicting the 
economy, including financial 
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booms and busts. As an Information 
Systems (IS) researcher, my interest 
is in the role that Information 
Technology (IT) plays in economic 
theories.  Why did most economists 
fail to predict the global financial 
crisis? My answer is simple: most 
economists have several blind 
spots with regard to IT. Therefore, 
they are not fully equipped to 
analyze and redesign complex 
financial digitized platforms and 
products.
Indeed very few economists, 
both economists working at 
universities and those working in 
the financial industry, were able 
to foresee the weaknesses of the 
global digitized financial system 
and identify the consequences 
and impact of these weaknesses. 
Examples of some academic 
economi s t s  who  d id  wa r n 
about systematic flaws in the 
financial systems, but not from 
an IT perspective, were professor 
Robert Shiller (Yale University) and 
professor Nouriel Roubini (New 
York University).  
Rober t  Sh i l l e r  ( toge ther 
with Karl Case) wrote an article 
entitled Full House in the Wall 
Street Journal in August 2006, in 
which they warned that “there 
is significant risk of a very bad 
period, with slow sales, slim 
commissions, falling prices, rising 
default and foreclosures, serious 
trouble in financial markets, and 
a possible recession sooner than 
most of us expected.” Around 
that time Nouriel Roubini was 
interviewed by the Wall Street 
Journal and declared that: “As the 
housing sector slumps, the job 
and income and wage losses in 
housing will percolate throughout 
the economy,” and “Consumers 
also face high energy prices, higher 
interest rates, stagnant wages, 
negative savings and high debt 
levels,” and “This is the tipping 
point for the U.S. consumer and 
the effects will be ugly,” and 
“Expect the great recession of 
2007 to be much nastier, deeper 
and more protracted than the 2001 
recession.” The article concludes 
with: “He also sees many of the 
same warning signs in other 
economies, including some in 
Europe.” (MARKET WATCH, 2006). 
So, both professors explained as 
early as 2006 the development 
of the US housing bubble and 
predicted the impact of the 
housing bubble burst on the rest 
of the economy. At that time not 
many people were listening or 
agreed with their analysis. “While 
many economists share Roubini’s 
concerns about imbalances in the 
global economy and in the U.S. 
housing sector, he stands nearly 
alone in predicting a recession next 
year”, indicated that same Wall 
Street journal article of August 23, 
2006, and also “FED watcher Tim 
Duy called Roubini the “the current 
archetypical Eeyore,” responding 
to a comment Dallas FED President 
Richard Fisher made last week in 
referring to economic pessimists as 
“Eeyores,” after Winnie the Pooh’s 
grumpy friend”. 
Most economists working at 
universities and in the industry 
were taken by surprise by the 
global impact. For example Alan 
Greenspan, chairman of the FED for 
almost 19 years, made clear in a US 
congress hearing in October 2008 
that the housing market meltdown 
had revealed a flaw in a lifetime 
of economic thinking and left him 
in a “state of shocked disbelief” 
(ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2008).
Greenspan’s “shocking” statement 
to the US congress can be seen 
on Youtube, where it is possible 
to hear from the main financial 
regulator of the biggest economy 
in the world that he doesn’t “fully 
understand why and where it 
happened” (see the US House 
Oversight Committee questioning 
Alan Greenspan in October 
2008: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=txw4GvEFGWs).
One could argue that economic 
phenomena are indeed very 
difficult to analyze and predict due 
to the fact that one cannot study 
these phenomena in isolation. 
There wil l  always be social 
interaction between the economic 
phenomena and economists (as 
active players in the economy). 
The actions of economists will 
also have a second-order effect on 
other stakeholders in the economy. 
Therefore, it is difficult to theorize 
about and validate the economic 
cause-effect relationships. In the 
so-called beta sciences, such 
as engineering, chemistry, and 
biology, it is relatively easier. The 
object of study is more “under 
control” and the object is not 
talking back or taking actions. 
Bridges, molecules, and plants are 
not listening to academic research 
and are not following action. 
Another argument is that there 
is a lack of historical perspective by 
the economic field and therefore 
economists need to be humble with 
regard to the contribution of their 
academic economic research to 
society. Nowadays, the economic 
field in the era of neo-liberalism 
is dominated by econometrics, 
and econometric researchers and 
practitioners are developing very 
complex models. These models are 
validated in a very short period of 
time (from a historical perspective), 
for example, under real “bull” 
market (rising) conditions, and 
not tested under “bear” market 
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(declining) conditions. Therefore 
the generalizabil i ty of these 
complex models is limited but 
usually quickly applied on a global 
scale via computerized trading 
platforms.
Both the social interaction 
argument and the histor ical 
argument hold true. However, I will 
argue in this “pensata” that there 
is another and more fundamental 
argument that plays a role. In my 
opinion it has to do with the five IT 
blind spots of economists. Each of 
these blind spots will be explained 
and illustrated. 
Usage of IT neglected
The f i rs t  b l ind spot is  that 
econometric models usually neglect 
the role of IT. Here my quip is: “IT 
is everywhere, except in the models 
of the economists.” This topic has 
already been debated for many 
years and is called the “productivity 
paradox”. As pointed out by 
the Nobel laureate development 
economist Robert Solow in his 
article titled “We’d better watch 
out” published on the New York 
Times Book Review: “You can 
see the computer age everywhere 
but in the productivity statistics”. 
The point economists made was 
that, although investments in 
information technology were 
strong, the impact on output 
measures, such as higher labor 
productivity or total factor outputs 
at the national level, were not 
seen in the data. Finally, work 
by Erik Brynjolffson in the 1990s 
and beyond showed the profound 
impact of IT on productivity levels. 
Later work also showed a strong 
relationship with productivity at 
the firm level. Erik Brynjolffson and 
Lorin Hitt, for example, concluded 
that their results indicate that 
information systems have made 
a substantial and statistically 
significant contribution to firm 
output.
The financial industry is a 
heavy user of IT, ranging from 
quantum trading to exploring new 
business models with the help of 
advanced technologies. It is not 
so much the technology itself (the 
hardware and software forming 
digitized trading platforms) but the 
way the technology is used that 
will create competitive advantage 
for firms that are able to use 
these advanced technologies. 
The use of IT might improve the 
efficiency, the effectiveness, or 
the innovativeness of firms in the 
financial industry. New financial 
products, such as credit default 
swaps, are digitally intensive, 
both in their design and in their 
usage. Advanced computerized 
trading systems are able to trade 
complex f inanc ia l  products 
worldwide in nanoseconds. The 
level of complexity and the level 
of interconnectedness of the global 
financial industry due to the usage 
of IT are profound. According 
to the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) the global over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
market (forwards and swaps, 
and options) is 638,928 billion 
in US dollars (June 2012) (see 
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_
qt1212.htm).On an average trading 
day, hundreds of thousands of 
contracts are exchanged between 
sellers and buyers using advanced 
information technologies.
More IT savvy firms, in other 
words firms that use IT as a strategic 
asset, are able to reap the benefits. 
They will have the organizational 
capabilities to design and use 
digitized platforms and therefore 
create competitive advantages 
(WEILL and ARAL, 2006). The 
empirical evidence is strong but 
not much evidence is incorporated 
in the econometric models.
Flawed measurement of 
variables in a digitizing world
Many of the important economic 
variables are flawed, both in their 
definition and their measurement as 
one takes into account the advanced 
digitization of the economy. Two 
examples are presented to illustrate 
this blind spot. The first example 
deals with inflation. Inflation 
is a crucial variable for most 
governments and central banks. 
Inflation is defined as a rise in 
the level of prices of goods and 
services in an economy over a 
period of time. In most countries 
inflation is measured in a simple 
way by buying a certain “basket” 
of products and services every 
month and determining the total 
price level in that month. Usually 
countries measure a limited set of 
products and services with a limited 
frequency (for example, once per 
month). Recently, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) 
announced the Billion Prices 
project that is constantly measuring 
prices collected from thousands of 
online retailers around the world 
on a daily basis (see http://bpp.
mit.edu). The first results show that 
the real level of inflation is rather 
different than most economists, 
politicians, and central bankers 
anticipated. Outlier is Argentina 
with a measured average inflation 
level of 20.1% over the period 2007-
2011, but where the politicians and 
central bank of Argentina thought 
it was 8.4% (CAvALLO, 2012). 
The second example relates 
to the measurement of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of a 
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country. It refers to the market 
value of all officially recognized 
final goods and services produced 
within a country in a given period. 
GDP in itself is a strange indicator 
because it does not matter if it 
is a good or bad activity. A firm 
that is polluting the environment 
is making a great contribution to 
the GDP, according to the GDP 
logic (see also BRYSON, 1999). 
According to MIT researchers Erik 
Brynjolfsson and Adam Saunders 
digital products and services are 
not well accounted for in the 
GDP, since the information sector 
is about the same share of GDP it 
used to be more than 20 years ago, 
even with the explosive increase of 
information goods consumption in 
our lives in the same period. Digital 
products and services are not very 
well represented in the GDP data. 
In short, when one is buying a 
physical book in a bookshop 
this transaction will be taken into 
account in the GDP of the country 
where the bookshop is situated. 
However, if a customer orders 
an electronic book online, for 
example via Kindle, the e-reader 
of the online retailer Amazon, the 
online transaction is not taken into 
account in the GDP of the country 
where the electronic book was 
bought or where the electronic 
book was used. Therefore, parts 
of the economy that are heavily 
digitized, such as electronic books 
and digital music, and countries 
that are active in these industries 
are underrepresented in these GDP 
measurements.
The ongoing digitalization, 
consider for example the mobile 
apps markets, is making the 
traditional GDP measurement less 
accurate and not a strong indicator 
of the final (digital) goods and 
services produced by a country. 
However, GDP is playing a more 
and more prominent role in the 
rules for economic and fiscal 
governance for, for example, the 
euro-area member states, e.g. the 
general government deficit must 
not exceed 3% of GDP and public 
debt must not exceed 60% of GDP 
(or at least diminish sufficiently 
towards the 60% threshold). There 
is a big need to improve the GDP 
measurements in a digitized world.
Not much attention to 
designing complex systems
In many academic fields “system 
thinking” is a core act ivi ty. 
Architects are designing complex 
skyscrapers using tubular systems, 
e.g. designing a skyscraper to act 
like a hollow cylinder in order to 
resist lateral loads (wind, seismic). 
Biologists are simulating a cell as a 
system and are looking for enzyme 
interactions. Chemists use system 
thinking to understand the complex 
interactions of atoms. A complex 
system has interconnected parts 
that as a whole exhibit one or more 
properties not obvious from the 
properties of the individual parts. 
Complex systems are analyzed 
and designed by, for example, 
physicists, biologists, chemists 
and management scientists. They 
design complex systems that 
are robust and flexible. Take 
for example the work of the 
physicist Albert-László Barabási on 
network theory (see for example 
BARABÁSI, 2010; SONG and others, 
2010). In his work he analyzes the 
structure of so-called scale-free 
networks that are characteristic for 
the functioning of systems such 
as the World Wide Web or the 
cell as the basic unit of a living 
organism. Scale-free networks are 
characterized by few central nodes 
with many linkages and a power-
law distribution of the number of 
links connected to a node. Scale-
free networks are usually robust 
to random failure of nodes, but 
vulnerable to failure of highly 
connected nodes. Recent research 
of the global financial network 
shows a high connectivity among 
the different financial institutions 
and strong interdependency, which 
makes the network vulnerable to 
instability (see SCHWEITZER and 
others, 2009, for a first analysis of 
the global financial network and 
its challenges).
Economists are usually not at 
the forefront in complex systems 
theory and thus are not very well 
trained to design and validate 
complex systems. Systems thinking 
is considered as too much an 
“engineer” activity and, given the 
hierarchy of the paradigms in 
universities, it is not valued by some 
academics. However, complex 
global digitized trading platforms 
and applications require “soft 
systems” thinking (CHECKLAND, 
1998).
Strict division between macro 
and micro-economics
The field of economics is divided 
between micro-economics and 
macro-economics. There is not 
much interaction taking place 
between those two academic 
fields. Macro-economists focus on 
models that analyze and predict 
the behavior of the economy as a 
whole. Micro-economists work on 
the behavior of firms or individuals. 
However, in practice more macro-
micro interaction is needed to 
understand both sides of the same 
coin. The development and usage 
of advanced IT, such as social media 
and visualization technologies, 
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will provide the opportunity to 
link micro behavior of individuals 
(consumers, employees) to macro 
policies and vice versa. Google, 
for example, is doing thousands of 
experiments, under the guidance 
of its chief economist Hal varian, 
to find out how micro behavior of 
its clients is related to the design 
of its applications, such as its key 
word auction Google Adwords. 
Experiments deal with varying 
information strategies that might 
attract potential consumers to 
web sites that are ranked higher 
in Google’s key word auctions. 
The outcome of these experiments 
provides insights about how the 
“informedness” of customers might 
create opportunities both for 
customers and firms and generate 
value for the economy as a whole 
(see LI, 2009). Another example is 
the aggregation of data with regard 
to traffic and trade via Google’s 
platform, which will provide 
information about global trends 
of products and services and the 
flow of money that is following 
the opposite direction of the flow 
of products and services.
The capabilities to process 
and analyze big datasets provide 
academics and practitioners with 
the possibility of linking micro-
behavior to macro-outcomes and 
of creating the knowledge for 
understanding these complex 
micro-macro interactions. It is even 
more complex as suggested by 
the social scientist Bruno Latour, 
who is hypothesizing that the 
micro-macro level is not only a 
very outdated concept but also 
incorrect:  “the whole is always 
smaller than its parts”.  Due to 
advanced digital technologies 
and databases Bruno Latour et 
al. (2012) illustrate that these 
technologies are able to trace and 
visualize social phenomena without 
distinguishing the micro and macro 
level anymore.  Bruno Latour et al. 
are using the example of exploring 
the keyword “self-organization” in 
the Web of Science between 2006 
and 2010 using digital visualization 
technologies. One can explore 
the network of this keyword 
that is built using as nodes all 
keywords, authors, references 
and addresses of the articles 
which use the keyword “self-
organization”. Links between two 
nodes are created whenever these 
two entities appear in the same 
article and weights are attributed 
to these links depending on the 
frequency of these co-appearances. 
Node specialization is performed 
using a graph layout algorithm for 
network visualization (LATOUR 
and others, 2012). Due to these 
data representation techniques the 
division between the individual 
and the whole – in this case the 
keyword and its network with 
nodes – becomes obsolete. As 
Latour et al. discuss: “This is 
exactly what the striking extension 
of digital tools is doing to the very 
notions of ‘individual’ and ‘wholes’. 
The experience (more and more 
common nowadays) of navigating 
on a screen from elements to 
aggregates may lead researchers to 
grant less importance to those two 
provisional end points. Instead of 
having to choose and thus to jump 
from individuals to wholes, from 
micro to macro, you occupy all 
sorts of other positions, constantly 
rearranging the way profiles are 
interconnected and overlapping.”
Another example illustrating 
the role of digital technologies 
and their impact on micro- and 
macro-economics is the discussion 
about the impact of e-money 
on the different stakeholders in 
the economy. In their research 
of M-PESA in Kenya, a short 
message service (SMS)-based 
money transfer system that allows 
individuals to deposit, send, and 
withdraw funds from a virtual 
account on their cell phones and 
that is separate from the banking 
system, William Jack, Tavneet Suri, 
and Robert Townsend investigated 
how existing models of monetary 
theory can be used  to think about 
the impact of mobile banking on 
the operations of the financial 
system and the implications for 
monetary and regulatory policy 
decisions that are faced by the 
central bank. The M-PESA example 
shows how e-money becomes a 
part of the economy and how the 
traditional banking institutions 
(such as the central bank) are 
extended with mobile operators 
(that are handling the e-money 
accounts). Managing liquidity by 
the central bank and managing 
e-liquidity by the mobile operators 
is just one issue that needs to be 
carefully analyzed and designed.
These examples show that 
due to digital technologies the 
boundar ies  between micro-
economics and macro-economics 
are blurr ing and new ways 
of analyzing, explaining, and 
predicting economic phenomena 
are possible. 
Decisions by rational man 
taken for granted
The dominant paradigm in the field 
of economics is still the rational 
model of man. Even though it has 
been known for a long time that 
human beings process information 
differently and also take decisions 
differently. Outsiders such as the 
psychologist and sociologist Herbert 
Simon introduced the concept 
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of “bounded rationality” and the 
psychologist Daniel Kahneman 
introduced concepts such as 
“prospect theory” (together with 
Amos Tversky). Herbert Simon and 
Daniel Kahneman were awarded 
the Nobel Prize in Economics in 
1978 and 2002 respectively. A central 
element in the concept of bounded 
rationality is that the human brain has 
very limited information processing 
capabilities. Therefore, human 
decision makers show “satisficing” 
behavior, e.g. they are looking for 
solutions that satisfy the problem at 
hand. Human decision makers are 
not looking for optimal solutions 
given the costs of information 
processing and the potential future 
risks at hand.
Humans, as prospect theory 
explains, are risk-taking to avoid 
losses and risk-averse for securing 
gains. A small example wil l 
illustrate this. If you ask people to 
choose between: 
A.  Getting $1000 with certainty;  
B.  Getting $2500 with 50% chance.
Most pick the first option with 
the preference for a certain $1000, 
although the second option has a 
mathematical expectation of $1250. 
The decision indicates risk-averse 
behavior. If you ask then to choose 
between:
A.  Getting a loss of $1000 with 
certainty;
B.  Getting 50% chance of no loss 
or a $2500 loss.
Most answer the second 
question with the second option 
although it is much more risky. 
This decision indicates risk-seeking 
behavior. As prospect theory 
explains: most of us find losses 
roughly twice as painful as we find 
gains pleasurable. Prospect theory 
is a good candidate for explaining 
trading behavior of humans in 
financial markets, e.g. to avoid 
losses, traders will trade more 
and incur higher losses resulting 
in trading more, etcetera. In his 
recent book, Daniel Kahneman 
provides an excellent overview 
of the different biases of human 
decision making.
Both Nobel laureates made 
clear that full rational decision 
making is rare and that humans are 
taking decisions based not only on 
potential outcomes. Two research 
directions are seen. The first 
direction focuses on the behavioral 
side of decision making and dives 
into the human brain. via the 
use of brain scanning technology 
(such as functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI)) one 
can detect what part of the brain 
is used in specific decisions and 
how decision making in/by the 
human brain system is done. 
New fields like neuro-economics, 
neuro-marketing, and neuro-
information systems are explored. 
The second direction focuses on 
the automation of human decision 
making. Here we enter the world 
of robotics and intelligent software 
agents. A recent New York Times 
article “Skilled Work, Without the 
Worker” compares the assembly 
of Apple’s iPhones by 1.2 million 
low-skilled workers in China 
with the completely robotized 
factory of Philips in Drachten, the 
Netherlands. The Philips factory 
has 128 robotic arms and these are 
assembling electric shavers. Robots 
work 365 days a year, 24 hours a 
day with no coffee breaks. “With 
these machines, we can make any 
consumer device in the world,” 
said Binne visser, an electrical 
engineer who manages the Philips 
assembly line in Drachten. Robotics 
will have some implications for job 
markets and economies around the 
world (see also Andrew McAfee’s 
TED Palk at http://www.ted.com/
talks/andrew_mcafee_are_droids_
taking_our_jobs.html).
But not al l tasks wil l be 
automated immediately. Most 
human decision making will be 
supported by intelligent software 
agents. These agents will have 
the data processing power and 
algorithms to support and improve 
human decision making. These 
agents are able to learn and can 
help in complicated supply chain 
situations both at the tactical and 
strategic level of decision making 
(KETTER and others, 2012). 
However, most economists, 
both in academia and in practice, 
have not been able or have not yet 
been eager to adopt these concepts 
in their work. New concepts of 
human decision making with 
digital support are needed. 
Challenges to overcome these 
blind spots
Economists are facing several 
challenges in transforming the 
economic field both in the academic 
and in the business world. The five 
blind spots that are identified are 
useful to start designing more 
IT savvy economic paradigms. 
Research collaboration between 
economists and informat ion 
system researchers is an important 
step forward. There are several 
initiatives such as the Economics 
and Information Systems track at 
the European and International 
Conference on In format ion 
Systems (ECIS and ICIS) and the 
Workshop of Information Systems 
and Economics (WISE) bridging 
insights from IT and economics 
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(more on http://www.wiseconf.
org/). But also in economics a 
new wave of researchers are 
positioning themselves around 
initiatives such as the Institute for 
New Economic Thinking (INET) 
(more on http://ineteconomics.
org/). Also updating the economics 
curriculum of economics Master 
and PhD programs in universities 
and bringing in elements discussed 
in the five blind spots will improve 
the quality of education and provide 
a new generation of economists. 
New waves of technologies will 
continue to evolve and transform the 
behavior of individuals and societies. 
The next generation economic 
models, concepts, and systems will 
be able to take into account these 
digital technologies in a robust way. 
In my opinion developing economic 
theories is too important to be left 
only to economists.
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